Generate SBOMs at build time by default. This is what the NSA asks for on contracted software, and it captures dependency data that no after-the-fact analysis can fully reconstruct.
If you sell software to the US government, or to anyone who does, the question is no longer whether you will be asked for a Software Bill of Materials. It is whether the one you hand over will stand up to scrutiny.
Over the past five years, three US sources have shaped what buyers expect from an SBOM: Executive Order 14028, the National Security Agency's SBOM management guidance, and the 2026 Minimum Elements for an SBOM published by CISA this summer. Together they have moved the SBOM from a nice-to-have inventory to a document that is requested in procurement, checked against what was delivered, and used to respond when the next critical vulnerability lands.
Executive Order 14028 asks federal agencies to buy software from suppliers that follow secure development practices, including providing an SBOM for each product. It does not, on its own, create a legal duty for private companies. That duty arrives through acquisition policy and contract clauses.
Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity, was signed on 12 May 2021. Its fourth section, on enhancing software supply chain security, starts with a diagnosis: commercial software development often lacks transparency, a strong focus on resisting attack, and adequate controls against tampering. The order gives priority to critical software, meaning software that runs with elevated privileges or has direct access to networking and computing resources.
Section 4 tasked the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with identifying standards and best practices for secure software development. It listed providing a purchaser with an SBOM, directly or on a public website, among the practices expected of federal suppliers. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) was asked to define the minimum elements of an SBOM, which it published on 12 July 2021.
This is where many articles go wrong. An executive order binds the executive branch. It reaches a vendor only once it has been turned into acquisition policy and contract terms. That is why so much of the order consists of instructions to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), CISA, NIST and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Council. Federal agencies can require SBOMs as part of secure procurement, and increasingly do. The order made that possible. It did not make it automatic.
EO 14028 became a procurement requirement through NIST's Secure Software Development Framework (SP 800-218) and OMB memoranda M-22-18 and M-23-16. Federal software suppliers must now sign a CISA self-attestation form confirming that they follow secure development practices.
The translation happened in three steps:
EO 14144 (January 2025) tightened attestation requirements. EO 14306 (June 2025) removed the validation-artifact and audit requirements again. The SSDF self-attestation obligation itself remains in place.
Executive Order 14144, signed on 16 January 2025, tightened the regime. It called for:
Executive Order 14306, signed on 6 June 2025, pulled part of that back. It removed the requirement to submit validation artifacts and the mandate for CISA to audit a sample of attestations. The underlying self-attestation obligation under OMB M-22-18 and its successors stayed in place.
The lesson is not that federal pressure eased. It was redistributed. The formal audit machinery is lighter, but False Claims Act exposure never depended on an executive order, and agencies and prime contractors have moved the evidence request into source selection. A supplier that cannot show what is inside its product still loses the bid. It simply loses it commercially rather than through an audit finding.
The NSA treats the SBOM as an operational tool, not a compliance file. For software developed under contract, it recommends generating SBOMs from source code at build time. Where source code or build information is not available, such as legacy software, it recommends obtaining SBOMs and vulnerability information through binary analysis.
On 14 December 2023, the office of the National Manager for National Security Systems published Recommendations for Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) Management. The guidance is aimed at owners of National Security Systems and was built on hands-on evaluation of commercial SBOM management tools.
The NSA links the SBOM to three continuous activities:
None of these is a one-off event. They repeat every time software is added, updated or retired.
The most quoted recommendation in the document is to obtain SBOMs and related vulnerability and code quality information from analysis of software binaries. That information includes Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). The NSA is candid that the accuracy and timeliness of binary analysis still need work. It nevertheless presents binary analysis as the way forward for legacy software without accessible source code or build information.
Both halves matter. For software developed under contract, the guidance says the SBOM should be generated from source code at the build stage. The honest reading is that build-time generation makes the claim and binary analysis tests it. They are two inputs to one pipeline, not competing philosophies. The NSA's tooling requirements reflect this by asking for SBOM generation from build environments, binary files and system registry queries.
The NSA advises buyers to negotiate limited rights to reverse-engineer delivered software so they can validate SBOMs. Buyers should also require complete component data, integrity proofs and secure-by-design metrics from suppliers.
Validating a supplier's SBOM against a delivered binary can require techniques that a standard software license forbids. The NSA therefore advises buyers to negotiate limited rights to reverse-engineer delivered software for the specific purpose of validating SBOMs and resolving discrepancies. At that point, binary verification stops being a tooling choice and becomes a clause someone has to negotiate before signature.
The NSA's contract expectations are concrete. They include:
Buyers are also expected to check every SBOM for accuracy and completeness on delivery, not file it unread.
On 29 July 2026, CISA, the NSA, the FBI and fifteen international partners published 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), version 2.1. It replaces the NTIA minimum elements from 2021, adds new elements such as generation context, component hashes and author signatures, and makes SBOMs far easier to verify.
The US position on SBOMs is now expressed jointly and internationally.
The new elements, and why they matter:
|
New element |
Why it matters |
|---|---|
|
SBOM Generation Context |
Tells the consumer how the SBOM was produced, so build-time and binary-derived SBOMs are declared rather than guessed. |
|
Component Hash Value |
Gives independent analysis a basis for comparing what the supplier declared with what actually shipped. |
|
Component Hash Algorithm |
Makes those hash comparisons reproducible. |
|
SBOM Author Signature |
Makes the provenance of the SBOM itself verifiable. |
|
SBOM Data Format Name and Version |
Shows which standard and version the SBOM follows. |
|
SBOM Tool Name and Version |
Identifies the tool that generated the SBOM, so consumers can judge its reliability. |
|
SBOM Version |
Tracks revisions of the same SBOM over time. |
|
Component License |
Records licensing information for each component. |
When a third party generates an SBOM for software it did not write, which is exactly the binary scanning case, the two fields now differ in plain sight.
Several existing elements were substantially updated, including Component Identifiers, Coverage, and Explicitly Identifying Unknown Information. The Access Controls element was folded into Distribution and Delivery.
CISA is careful to say the minimum elements create no new legal requirements. They refine how organizations should request, generate and analyze SBOMs. They apply to all software, including open source, AI systems and software as a service (SaaS).
The EU Cyber Resilience Act requires an SBOM in the technical documentation of products with digital elements, and Germany, Japan and India have published their own SBOM guidance. One well-run SBOM process can serve several regulators at once.
The 2026 minimum elements themselves point to the EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. The CRA requires manufacturers of products with digital elements to include an SBOM in their technical documentation. CRA reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities has applied since 11 September 2026, and the full obligations follow on 11 December 2027.
Other countries are moving in the same direction:
Internationally, CISA and the NSA joined nineteen international organizations in September 2025 behind A Shared Vision of Software Bill of Materials for Cybersecurity. In May 2026, CISA and G7 partners extended the concept to artificial intelligence.
Generate SBOMs at build time, verify them with binary analysis, reconcile the two outputs, document how each SBOM was produced, and write the requirements into your contracts.
The program that follows from these documents fits on one page. Most organizations are missing at least half of it.
Generate SBOMs at build time by default. This is what the NSA asks for on contracted software, and it captures dependency data that no after-the-fact analysis can fully reconstruct.
Add binary analysis as a check, not a replacement. Cover acquired components, vendor-delivered binaries, container images and legacy systems with no build pipeline.
Reconcile the two outputs and keep the record. The new hash elements exist so that declared components can be compared with delivered artifacts. That comparison report is what an auditor or prime contractor wants to see.
Record how every SBOM was produced. Use Generation Context, Tool Name and Version, and Author, so downstream consumers can judge each SBOM's completeness.
Put the requirements into contracts, not internal wikis. Keep the evidence behind your SSDF self-attestation current. The obligation to attest survived 2025, and the expectation that you can prove it never depended on an audit clause.
Tooling checklist. When choosing tooling, use the NSA's functional list as a checklist:
No general US law requires every software company to produce an SBOM. In practice, federal agencies can and increasingly do require SBOMs through procurement and contract terms, building on Executive Order 14028. Federal suppliers must also attest to secure development practices under the SSDF.
No. Executive Order 14306 removed the duty to submit validation artifacts and CISA's sample audits of attestations. The underlying SSDF self-attestation obligation remains, and agencies and prime contractors still ask for evidence during source selection.
They are the baseline data fields an SBOM should contain. CISA, the NSA, the FBI and international partners published them as version 2.1 on 29 July 2026. They replace the 2021 NTIA minimum elements and add new elements, including SBOM Generation Context, component hashes, SBOM Author Signature and Component License.
The two widely used standards are SPDX and CycloneDX. The NSA expects SBOM management tools to support both, in JSON and XML, and to convert between formats.
Yes. CISA states that the 2026 minimum elements apply to all software, including open source, AI systems and software as a service.
Both. The NSA recommends generating SBOMs from source at build time for software developed under contract. It recommends binary analysis to validate SBOMs and to cover legacy or third-party software where source code is not available.
Compare the supplier's declared components with an independent analysis of the delivered binary, using the component hashes now included in the minimum elements. Make sure your contract allows this kind of analysis, and keep the reconciliation report as evidence.
Yes. The CRA requires an SBOM in the technical documentation of products with digital elements, and several European agencies co-authored the CISA minimum elements. A single, well-designed SBOM process can support both US procurement and CRA compliance.
US regulators have converged on one expectation. A software buyer should be able to know what is inside a delivered product, verify that claim independently, and act on it quickly when a new vulnerability appears. Executive Order 14028 made the demand legitimate, the NSA supplied the operational detail, and the 2026 minimum elements gave everyone a common vocabulary.
Organizations that treat SBOM generation, verification and reconciliation as one pipeline will find the next regulatory change far less disruptive. To see where your products stand today, talk to the BearingPoint Product Compliance & Security Services team about an SBOM readiness assessment or a pilot of [product name] on one of your products.